Indiana Law Journal
Volume 14

Issue 2

Article 8

12-1938

Criminal Law-Double Jeopardy-Dismissing after Jury Impaneled

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Criminal Law Commons

Recommended Citation
(1938) "Criminal Law-Double Jeopardy-Dismissing after Jury Impaneled," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 14 :
Iss. 2 , Article 8.
Available at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol14/iss2/8

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by
the Law School Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Indiana Law
Journal by an authorized editor of Digital Repository @
Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
rvaughan@indiana.edu.

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
the original proceeding. 2 1 Such action would burden the courts and take
away the advantages of regulation in specialized fields by independent adminis22
trative agencies.
The decision in the present case is in accord with the principle discussed
above. Whether the order complained of be considered legislative or judicial
in character, it is not directly reviewable. The respondents may obtain review
indirectly by refusing to furnish information and setting up the alleged unlawful
action of the commission as a defense in a suit by the commission to compel
the giving of the information asked.
E. 0. C.
CRIMINAL LAw-DOUBLE
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Defendant was indicted by the grand jury, pleaded not guilty, and the cause
was submitted to a jury for trial. In his opening statement to the jury, the
defense counsel made remarks to the effect that the prosecuting witness, the
defendant's daughter, was under arrest and took the witness stand as an
unwilling witness. Defense counsel continued to make similar remarks after
being reprimanded by the court. As a result of these statements the court
discharged the jury. Later, the defendant filed his motion for a discharge
from further prosecution and from jail on the grounds that he had been once
placed in jeopardy and that the jury had been discharged without legal right
and over his objections. This motion was overruled, exceptions were duly
saved, and the court's action is assigned as error on appeal. Held, reversed.
Armentrout vJ. State (Ind. 1938), 15 N. E. (2d) 363.
It is an established maxim at common law that a man shall not be brought
into danger of his life or limb for one and the same offense more than once.1
This principle has been incorporated into the Constitutions of the United
States and of the various states, giving the maxim the added weight of a
constitutional guarantee. Where a legal indictment has been returned by a
competent grand jury to a court having jurisdiction of the person and the
offense, and the defendant has pleaded, and a jury has been duly impaneled
and sworn, and all the preliminary requisites of record are ready for the trial,
2
settled law in this state holds that the prisoner has been once put in jeopardy.
Under the strict practice which formerly prevailed the discharge of the
jury for any cause after the proceedings had advanced to such a stage that
jeopardy had attached, but before a verdict, was held to sustain a plea of
former jeopardy, and therefore to operate practically as a discharge of the
prisoner.B In deference, however, to the necessities of justice, this strict rule
has been greatly relaxed, and the-general modern rule is that the court may
discharge a jury without working an acquittal of the defendant, in any case
21 Meyers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp. Ltd. (1938), 58 S. Ct. 459.
In answer to appellant's contention that rights guaranteed by the Federal
Constitution would be denied unless the court had jurisdiction the Court said,
"The contention is at war with the long-settled rule of judicial administration
that no one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury
until the prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted."
22 Federal Trade Commission v. Claire Furnace Co. (1927), 274 U. S.
160, 47 S. Ct. 160.
1 State v. Elder (1879), 65 Ind. 282, 32 Am. Rep. 69; Ex Parte Lange
(1875),
85 U. S. 163, 21 L. ed. 872.
2
Joy v. State (1860), 14 Ind. 139.
3 State v. Beal (1930), 199 N. C. 278, 15 S. E. 604.

RECENT C/1SE NOTES
where the ends of justice, under the circumstances, would otherwise be
defeated. 4 A state may appeal before or after a verdict, if the appeal does
not affect the defendant; a judge or a juror may die or become insane; a
jury may be discharged for misbehavior; a jury may fail to agree on a
verdict and be discharged. In all these cases there is no legal jeopardy
though a lawful jury has been impaneled and sworn and it is said that
jeopardy attaches at that moment. 5 Improper statements by the defense
counsel injecting new issues were held as a matter of law to be justifiable
cause for discharge of the jury.8 Juror's illness, conduct of witness, spectator,
or attorney,7 and similar occurrences, taking place without fault of defendant,
may, as regards former jeopardy, be sufficient ground for declaring mistrial. 8
Evidently in this case, the Supreme Court in overruling the lower court's
judgment, decided that the trial judge erred in discharging the jury; that
there was no legal necessity for the discharge of the jury. Here the trial had
barely begun. Had this prisoner been placed in danger of his life or limb?
True, the administration of justice requires that verdicts, criminal as well as
civil, shall be found by impartial juries, and shall be the result of honest
deliberations absolutely free from prejudice or bias. Further, it will not be
disputed that a prisoner should not be put in jeopardy twice for the same
offense. But the public as well as the accused have rights which must be
safeguarded. It is this policy which demands that the court be clothed with
the power to judge the necessity for discharging a jury.9 In every case of
this sort, however, the court must exercise a very sound discretion on the
facts, and this power must obviously be used with the greatest caution.1 O
In the principal case the trial court seems to have followed the modern trend,
which the Supreme Court has rejected. In so doing the Supreme- Court, the
writer believes, has failed to balance sufficiently the policies underlying this
proposition of double jeopardy. It has followed a strict interpretation of the
rules laid down by the older cases on this point in preference to the majority
viewpoint in the United States.
I. D. B.
INDEPENDENT

CONTRACTOR, LIABILITY FOR AcTs oF-INJuRY CAUSED BY CON-

VEHICLE UNDER CARRIER'S PERmrr.*-Action "by Mayer,
administrator, against defendant corporation for death of motorist in collision
caused by truck driver's negligence. The truck causing the injury was owned
by the truck driver subject to a mortgage, although defendant's name was on
it. Defendant held a permit from the Public Service Commission of Indiana
to operate the truck as a common carrier. The trucks were operated on
TRACTOR

OPERATING

4 Thompson v. United States (1894), 155 U. S. 271, 15 S. Ct. 73; United
States v. Perez (1824), 22 U. S. 579, 6 L. ed. 165? Dreyer v. People (1900),
188 II. 40, 58 N. E. 620, 58 L. R. -A. 869; People v. Simos (1931), 345 Ill.
226, 178 N. E. 188.
5 Willis, Constitutional Law, p. 529.
6 Commonwealth v. Cronin (1926), 257 Mass. 535, 15 N. E. 176.
7 But recently Justice Pecora of the New York Supreme Court in the Hines
case discharged the jury' on the ground of an improper question to a witness
by the prosecutor. Certainly in this case Hines could not be said to have
been in jeopardy.
8 People v. Simos (1931), 345 Ill. 226, 178 N. E. 188.
9 State v. Slorah (1919), 118 Me. 203, 106 Atl. 768, 4- A. L. R. 1256.
10 United States v. Perez (1824), 22 U. S. 579, 6 L. ed. 165.
* Two cases discussed.

